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Texas, Banks, and John Nance Garner 
BY GEORGE COOPER 
Number 1 
Good evening and thank you for attending tonight. Let me start by 
telling you how I got into this topic. A number of years ago, my friend 
Keith Volanto recommended that I speak at one of the TSHA seminars 
for teacher certification. The topic was open as long as I focused on the 
Great Depression and the New Deal. What came out of that was another 
presentation that I made a couple of years ago at this very conference in 
Nacogdoches, "South Texans in Washington during the New Deal." That 
was eventually published as an article in the Journal of South Texas, since 
my focus was primarily on South Texans and Alberto Rodriguez the editor 
was present in the audience that day. 1 
One of those South Texans, John Nance Garner was designated the 
point man on the Emergency Banking Bill of 1933 by President Roosevelt. 
It gnawed at the back of my brain for a while, and then I did the one thing 
that Jessica Brannon-Wranosky says a historian should never do, I asked 
why? That question is leading me on a "long and winding road," to quote 
the Beatles.2 Notice I said is, not has. 
The first topic to be addressed was John Nance Garner, himself. What 
did I know about him? Described by John L. Lewis as "a labor-baiting, pok-
er-playing, whiskey-drinking, evil old man," he was the son of John Nance 
Garner III, a confederate veteran, who moved to Texas not too long after the 
Civil War where he became a cotton broker and local politician. His mother 
was the daughter of a banker.3 The fruit never falls far from the tree. John 
Nance Garner was born in Detroit, Texas November 22, 1868. He was edu-
cated in rural schools in Bogata and Blossom Prairie, Texas. At age eighteen 
he left Texas, went to Nashville and entered Vanderbilt University. He only 
remained at Vanderbilt for one semester, why we are not sure. The 
reason most frequently put forward is ill health, but some have argued 
that the educational preparation he had received in Texas was not ade-
quate for the academic rigors of that particular school.4 
George Cooper is the immediate past President of the East Texas Historical 
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81 
82 
EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL J OURNAL 
However, despite his lack of success at Vanderbilt, Garner had already 
decided that he wanted more out of life than the arduous work on a farm.5 
Upon returning to Texas, Garner chose to read for the law in Clarks-
ville, the county seat of Red River County where he had grown up. It only 
took him three years before he was admitted to the bar in 1890. Two years 
later he moved to Uvalde, supposedly for health reasons, which would lend 
credence to his departure from Vanderbilt because of ill health as opposed 
to poor preparation. Arriving in Uvalde, he quickly developed a successful 
law practice in addition to a real estate business. Along the way, he ob-
tained the Uvalde newspaper in a legal settlement and obtained a title com-
pany, renaming it The Garner Abstract and Title Company. In 1895, the 
position of County Judge in Uvalde County was vacant. Garner entered 
the race, and won the Democrat Primary, essentially winning election.6 His 
opposition in that race was a woman, Marietta (Ettie) Rheiner, the daughter 
of a local rancher. Mind you, this is an age when women could not express 
their political opinions in public, much less vote or run for office. She 
opposed Garner because of his reputation as one who had a fondness for 
whiskey and poker, neither in my opinion, a disqualifying factor for public 
office. Garner took care of the matter in the best way possible. After a 
short courtship, he married the young lady, thus removing the main oppo-
sition to his holding public office in Uvalde. Shortly after Mr. Garner was 
elected county judge, the Victoria Advocate, which was not in Mr. Garner 's 
county, published the statement that, "The Democrat party is the only party 
on earth whose members are clueless about voting."7 While they may not 
have had Garner specifically in mind, it does give one pause to wonder 
exactly whom they had in mind. But that is a discussion for another time. 
In 1898, Garner was elected to the Texas State Legislature. He spent 
two terms in Austin, learning the process of legislation. While he spon-
sored few bills, he became known as a strong advocate of the Prickly Pear 
Cactus as the Texas state flower. Obviously that proposal lost to the Texas 
Bluebonnet, but his staunch support earned him the nickname of "Cactus 
Jack" which he would carry forward for the rest of his career. He did, 
while there, quickly ascend into committee leadership, a trait that would 
mark the rest of this political career. With an increase in population in 
the 1900 census, Texas obtained additional congressional representation, 
which meant new districts. As chairman of the Teas House Committee on 
Congressional Districts, Garner carved out a district, the Fifteenth Con-
gressional District, which ran from Corpus Christi, to Brownsville, to Del 
Rio, and which, of course, included Uvalde. In 1902, when the first elec-
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tions were held for someone to represent the Fifteenth Congressional Dis-
trict, John Nance Gamer would become that someone, and he was off to 
Washington. This it was also the same year that Texas instituted the poll 
tax effectively eliminating much of the majority Mexican American popu-
lation of his district from voting.8 
A back bencher, Garner spent a good bit of time again learning the 
ropes in the national legislature. For the most part, he worked behind the 
scenes not sponsoring bills, but doing the legislative work that needed to be 
done by his patrons. His wife Ettie worked as his secretary and organizer, 
both serving the Fifteenth District. His hard work and organizational skills 
paid off when he was elected Party Whip when the Democrats won control 
of the House of Representatives in 1910, and later the position of Minority 
Leader after the Republican landslide of 1928. That would change with 
the election of Richard M. Kleberg to take the seat of the Republican Harry 
Wurzbach following Wurzbach's death in 1931. Gamer was then elected 
Speaker of the House, succeeding his close friend Nicholas Longworth, 
husband of Alice Roosevelt. During his time in the House of Represen-
tatives, as Minority Whip, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, and Speaker of the House, Garner was viewed as a coalition builder 
and one who could work with Presidents, regardless of party.9 Further, by 
the time Gamer achieved the speakership, the position had recovered from 
the rebellion of twenty years earlier, and was again recognized as the lead-
er of the majority party, an extremely powerful position. 10 
With the seemingly insolvable problems of the Great Depression, at 
least for Herbert Hoover, it was a foregone conclusion that any Democrat 
capable of being nominated by the party was going to win the presidency 
in 1932. The 1930 Texas State Democratic Convention endorsed John 
Nance Garner as its preferred candidate for the party nomination for pres-
ident in 1932. 
Having said that, the Nacogdoches Herald excoriated the party for en-
dorsing Gamer and discussing the repeal of the 18th Amendment to the 
exclusion of all other topics at the convention. In the words of the Herald, 
"So far as the convention was concerned and apparently so far as Texas 
democrats know, there is no depression." Other problems The Herald felt 
should have been discussed included disarmament, war debts, recovery of 
export markets, tariffs, and the budget. 11 
Going into the national convention in Chicago two years later, the 
Governor of New York, Franklin Roosevelt was leading in the delegate 
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count, but under the archaic rules of the party he lacked the necessary 
two-thirds needed for nomination. Garner, favorite son candidate of Texas 
stood third in the ballot count, holding delegates primarily from Texas and 
California, the latter under the sway of William Randolph Hearst. In what 
may or may not have been a corrupt bargain in the Jacksonian sense, Gar-
ner released his delegates before the third ballot, Roosevelt was nominated 
and Garner became his vice-presidential candidate. 
After the election of Roosevelt and Garner, their being sworn into of-
fice on March 4, 1933, they immediately set to work to alleviate the prob-
lems of the country. Roosevelt called a special session of the new congress 
to address the legislative program he set before them. That "First One 
Hundred Days" became the standard by which all subsequent new presi-
dential terms have been judged. Included in the program which became 
known as The New Deal were sweeping reforms to the banking system. 
Gamer, now vice-president and presiding officer of the Senate was charged 
by Roosevelt with shepherding the Emergency Bank Bill of 1933 through 
Congress and getting it passed. It is at this point that I first asked that 
question, why? Why Gamer? Garner was a legislator, attorney, and busi-
nessman, but did Roosevelt designate Gamer for this job because he was 
good at manipulating votes, or was there something deeper, more complex 
at play here? Well, it turns out that there was. Garner was also a banker. 
He purchased the First State Bank of Uvalde in 1913. He also was one of 
the individuals involved in the founding of the First State Bank of Three 
Rivers, not far from Uvalde. Question solved, right? Not really, because 
there is still that confounded question, why? And it is at this point that I 
really begin that long and winding road that I referred to earlier. When 
one starts looking at the history of banks in the United States, much less 
in Texas, one starts dealing with banking law, questions of currency, gold 
standard, bi-metalism, populism, and manifold forms of popular distrust 
of the haves by the have nots. I had originally hoped to focus on banks in 
Garner's Fifteenth Congressional District, for obvious reasons. Hopefully 
I will get to that eventually. The deeper I dug, however, the more I realized 
I needed to address the issues of banking in Texas period. 
The issue of banks in Texas has always been amongst the most divisive 
issues to confront the state. From its very beginning as a Republic, Texas 
has reflected a basic Jacksonian distrust of banks. There were propos-
als for the creation of a national bank at the Constitutional Convention in 
183 6 proposed by Branch T. Archer. Asa Brigham put forth a resolution to 
create such an institution and that the provisional government grant such 
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a charter.12 But once it became known that Sam Houston, Andrew Jack-
son 's erstwhile protege, opposed a national bank, the creation of a Bank of 
Texas was specifically prohibited in the Constitution. The Constitution of 
the Republic of Texas included the provision that "No bank nor banking 
institution nor office of discount and deposit nor any other moneyed cor-
poration nor bank establishment shall ever exist during the continuance of 
the present constitution." 13 
To repay its indebtedness, the Republic of Texas issued promissory 
notes to individuals and businesses throughout the country. These notes 
were backed up by the value of land, of which the Republic had a surplus. 
However, most of the land in question had not even been surveyed, much 
less evaluated. As a result, the promissory notes were soon being discount-
ed throughout the Republic, and in New Orleans, the Republic's primary 
outlet for its cotton, by as much as fifty percent. Additionally, because the 
promissory notes were issued with rather large valuations, merchants and 
other individuals throughout the Republic began issuing their own bills 
which frequently could not be redeemed for specie. Specie, for the most 
part, had been driven from the republic, or was being hoarded by those few 
individuals who actually possessed any. In a report to the Senate of the Re-
public of Texas on April 16, 1838, the Committee on Finance proposed a 
bill, entitled "A Bill to establish the Bank of the Republic of Texas, " which 
would authorize the creation of bank of which the Republic of Texas would 
own all of the stock. The committee further proposed that capitalization be 
a minimum of $3 ,000,000, but the bank could not begin operation until at 
least $1,000,000 had been paid in specie. Notice the phrase "paid in" as 
opposed to subscribed. The bank would loan money to deserving individ-
uals and business at an interest rate of ten per cent per annum. 14 The Hous-
ton National Banner, editorialized that the regulation of currency was the 
most important function of the national government. 15 Sam Houston was 
still the president, Mirabeau B. Lamar was not inaugurated until December 
10th, so nothing came of the proposal at that time. Six days after Lamar 
entered office, however, the Congress of the Republic of Texas did pass an 
act chartering the "Texas Railroad, Navigation, and Banking Company." 16 
Capital was to be $5,000,000, and the company would be permitted to start 
operation as soon as twenty percent of the capital was subscribed. Sub-
scribed this time, not paid in. Although Branch T. Archer, Sam Houston, 
Stephen F. Austin, and Augustus Allen all were among the incorporators, 
eventually at least Houston and Austin failed to participate in the final for-
mation of the company. The company collapsed quickly, largely because 
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of the opposition of Anson Jones, but also because the economic crises of 
1837 in the United States was quickly having an impact on Texas. 17 
In 1845, as Texas prepared to become part of the United States, a new 
constitution was drafted. It was public knowledge that Houston was will-
ing to accept the creation of a State Bank, given how the Republic had 
struggled with the issue of currency and credit throughout its 
existence. However, Houston was not present at the Constitutional 
convention, having returned to Tennessee because of the imminent death 
of his mentor, Andrew Jackson. Once the delegates to the convention 
learned of Jackson's death, they donned black arm-bands, and with Jack-
son's ghost hovering over the convention, they deleted the provision au-
thorizing the Texas Railroad, Canal and Bank Company from operating a 
bank. When the Redeemers drafted a new Texas State Constitution, some 
members wanted to authorize the chartering of state banks in Texas, and 
although Houston was no longer present, the spirit of Jackson must have 
still been luring around the capital. The new state constitution was spe-
cifically silent on the issue of state chartered banks, neither permitting nor 
prohibiting banks in Texas. Into the void stepped merchants in commu-
nities throughout Texas, many acting as repositories of excess funds for 
their customers, some actually performing banking functions, but always 
without any oversight or control by any authority. 
The single biggest issue of banking during the period was the question 
of currency. In 1863, the Congress of the United States created a new 
national banking system to help finance the Civil War. Since the need for 
money outstripped the supply, under the terms of the National Banking 
Act of 1863, banks chartered under the Act were permitted to issue notes, 
referred to as Greenbacks, with a tax paid to the federal government on 
those notes. The amount of greenbacks issued by a given bank should 
not exceed 10% of the banks total capital. Supporting this act was a sec-
ondary act "An Act to support a National Currency, secured by the pledge 
of United States stocks [or bonds], and to provide for the Circulation and 
Redemption thereof." 18 
This removed the United States off reliance on specie, gold specifical-
ly, for commercial transactions. In 1875, under the leadership of Senator 
John Sherman, Congress passed the Specie Payment Resumption Act, ef-
fectively returning the United States to the gold standard.19 It was the Spe-
cie Resumption Act, and the following deflationary cycle, which brought 
the entire system back into political discussion as it now failed to serve the 
needs of the entire country. 
Vol. 56 SPRING 2018 Number 1 
Again there were arguments heard throughout the country, not just in 
Texas, that the national banking system should be eliminated. According 
to this, some banks chartered by states should again be allowed to issue 
notes that could be used as legal tender throughout the country. Charles F. 
Dunbar, in his 1897 article in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, logi-
cally made the argument that this would again throw the monetary system 
of the country into chaos. Dunbar went on to argue that the then existing 
system, while needing improvement, was the best option, as everyone un-
derstood that the United States government lent stability to the currency 
then in circulation. 2° Further, the uniformity of bills issued by nationally 
chartered banks, made business transactions on a nationwide basis easier to 
undertake.21 That did not mean, however, that some nefarious individuals 
did not attempt to print their own bills. The Rockdale Messenger found it 
necessary to publish a brief notice that if anyone questioned the validity of 
a bank note in their possession, all that was needed to verify was to dampen 
the note in question with a sponge. On a valid bank note the watermark 
would stand up to the test, but that on a forged note would wipe off.22 
Texas citizenry and merchants were forced to rely on Federally Char-
tered Banks for their banking needs. The federal law worked well, within 
limits. Under the federal banking law of 1868, banks were required to post 
a minimum capitalization of $50,000 to obtain that charter, and they were 
prohibited from taking land as collateral for loans. Both were problems for 
the residents of cash poor, land rich Texas. With the withdrawal of green-
backs by the federal authorities, the nation fell back on gold and silver 
coins for the transactions of business. In the areas of the old Confederacy, 
including Texas, there was a lack of both. While the Federal Banking Law 
was amended in 1900, making some beneficial changes, the restrictions 
on taking land as collateral remained, leaving Texas farmers with both a 
shortage of physical money and dependable credit facilities. 
While the lack of money in circulation was a continuing problem, the 
admission of six western states in the years of 1889 and 1890 brought in-
creased pressure in the Senate, if not the House, to convert to a bi-metallic 
system, as all six of the states then admitted had large silver mining opera-
tions. Despite a lack of interest in going to a bi-metallic system in the House, 
the block of twelve new senators with this common goal managed to get 
the Sherman Silver Purchase Act passed through both houses of Congress 
in 1896 by linking it to the McKinley Tariff which did have support in the 
House. 23 Silver, purchased at a ratio of 16 ounces of silver for each ounce of 
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In 1900, the problem of a federally chartered banking system was com-
pounded by the monopolization of the banking industry by trusts, just as 
every other industry in the country was. In the eyes of Texas newspa-
permen this was even more criminal than the domination of other indus-
tries. While reporting that the United States government, as of Decem-
ber 21, 1899, had a national debt of $1,590,000,000, and cash on hand of 
$1,050,000,000, the Victoria Advocate also noted that John D. Rockefel-
ler's Standard Oil Trust controlled eight banks and ten trust companies in 
New York, with tentacles that reached into and controlled banking in such 
cities as Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, New Orleans, and San Francis-
co. The article goes on to list several of the bank and trust companies 
owned by the trust and noted that its combined capital was $170,527,880, 
and deposits of $229,206,000, and outstanding loans of $943,413,000.24 I 
suspect that the only thing the author of the article was complaining about 
was the concentration of that much wealth in the hands of so few. When 
one considers that even if all the deposits were demand deposits and that 
amount was added to all the outstanding loans, the combined capital hold-
ings represented fifteen percent of all potential losses, a ratio that any bank 
would be happy to maintain. 
The banking, or one should say currency, issue had been a large part of 
the presidential campaign in 1896. Not only did the selection of William 
Jennings Bryan as the candidate of both the Democrat and People's Parties 
leave the latter as a mere shadow of what it had been by time of the 1900 
presidential campaign season its selection of Wharton Barker as its can-
didate in 1900 further damaged its message. Wharton, a banker himself, 
publicly stated he chose to ignore the money issue.25 With the nomination 
of a "me too" Progressive by the People's Party, the voices of those who 
railed against the national monetary and banking system was once again 
muted by the big national banks. 
Over the next five years ending September 20 1905, Texas led the na-
tion in the chartering of new National Banks with 228 banks and over 
$12,000,000 in paid in capital. Still the demands for amending the state 
constitution to permit the chartering of banks by the State of Texas con-
tinued.26 If the only viable collateral a person had was his land, he ended 
up going to a private individual such as Wm. C. Whyte, who advertised 
in The State Herald, that he had money to lend on "Improved Black Land 
Farms," at seven percent interest. 27 The interest rate wasn't intolerable, 
but in a market of declining cotton prices, there was a good chance the 
farmer would not make enough money to pay off his loan. The state legis-
---
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lature finally passed a bill in 1905, authorizing the chartering of state banks 
and creating the Texas State Banking Commission. The requirements for 
chartering a "State" bank were lower than those for a federal charter, but 
perhaps more importantly, land could be taken as collateral for loans under 
the terms of the state banking law. Not one of the first wave of state banks 
chartered The First State Bank of Uvalde, was organized in John Nance 
Gamer's hometown in 1907, after the election of Tom Campbell, who sup-
ported much of this reformist legislation as the "progressive" candidate 
in the Democrat Party primary in 1906.28 While Gamer wasn't one of the 
original incorporators, he obviously kept an eye on this new endeavor in 
his home town. Remember, he was also involved in real estate in Uvalde. 
In 1909, to protect depositors of failed banks, the State of Texas joined 
with Oklahoma and seven other states which had created their own Depos-
itors Guaranty Funds. The debate within the banking community, and the 
population in general, about the creation of some type of fund to protect the 
deposits of individuals in banks was carried out in the newspapers through-
out the state. In an editorial reprinted in The Rockdale Reporter, the Dallas 
Times argued that the only way to get "timid investors" to get their money 
out of their mattresses and into a bank was to assure them that if the bank 
failed the government would make them whole again. The editorial went 
on to note that many bankers were opposed to the idea because it would 
"level" the competition, removing the advantage of good banking, good 
bankers, and knowledgeable management, thereby costing them deposits, 
and without saying it, profits.29 
Two months later the Mexia State Herald reported that the Oklaho-
ma State Banking Board had formulated a procedure whereby the national 
banks in that state could participate in the Oklahoma State Bank Guaranty 
Fund.30 The implication, of course, was that Texas was falling behind in the 
matter of depositor's insurance. And that same day, the same paper ran a 
notice that an application had been filed for the establishment of a National 
bank in Stanton with capitalization of $25,000, now permissible under the 
revision of the National Banking Act made in 1900.31 
Eighteen months later the Bell County Democrat provided their read-
ers with another reason for the creation of a state guaranty fund when it 
reported that a fraud order had been issued against the Bank Depositors In-
surance Company of Washington, D.C. which had been in business for ap-
proximately one year. The firm, capitalized in the amount of $1,000,000, 
promised to pay the depositors in the event of an insured bank's failure or 
closure. However, when The Defiance Bank of Defiance, Ohio, which had 
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purchased a policy with an $80,000 limit, failed, the company neglected to 
indemnify the depositors as it had contracted to do.32 The Bank Depositors 
Insurance Company was not regulated by the state banking or insurance 
regulatory Agency in Ohio, it was a private firm domiciled in the most 
unregulated city in the country, Washington, D.C. That same day, on the 
second page of the Bell County Democrat, in the Letters to the Editor sec-
tion, was a letter from a reader "Yarrell," who argued that Congress needed 
to pass legislation creating a national depositors insurance fund so that the 
fifty million or so depositors in national banks could sleep at night.33 
In 1913, Congress created the Federal Reserve System, providing ad-
ditional support for the banking system. This fundamentally restructured 
the nations monetary system, and provided what some felt finally stabi-
lized the financial system of the United States.34 It included stipulations 
for state chartered banks to become members providing they met the same 
requirements as federally chartered banks. 
At this point, John Nance Gamer, conservative businessman that he 
was, finally felt it safe to get involved in the banking business. In 1913, he 
bought the First State Bank of Uvalde. In addition, the very next year, he 
is listed as one of the incorporators of the First State Bank of Three Riv-
ers. The town really didn't exist yet, the railroad was just reaching the site 
where Three Rivers, originally Hamilltonian, would be developed. Again, 
the key here is that Gamer was a businessman, taking advantage of the 
opportunities that presented themselves. He could now make money by 
selling the real estate in the community, building the houses on the land he 
sold with his construction company, proofing the titles to the land through 
his title company, and providing the mortgages with his bank, whether in 
Uvalde or Three Rivers. Andrew Carnegie would have been proud. 
So, back to my original block of questions, why did Roosevelt choose 
Gamer to shepherd his Emergency Bank Bill through Congress. Gamer, 
as a banker, certainly understood the problems present in the banking com-
munity, both locally, nationally and internationally, so who better to over-
see a program to save the banking industry. Why was Gamer a banker? 
Simply because he stood to make additional money from the banking ser-
vices he sought to render to himself and his customers. Why did he not 
become a banker until 1913? Because he was a conservative businessman, 
not inclined to take unnecessary risk, and it was not until 1913 that all the 
pieces were in place to take the leap and risk his own capital on a banking 
endeavor. First, because federal requirements for the establishment of a 
bank were quite steep, and they restricted what could be taken as collateral 
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to exclude real property, he wasn't interested in owning or participating in 
a federally chartered bank. Second, once state bank chartering was created 
in Texas the qualifying monetary requirements were more reasonable and 
land could be taken as collateral, but that didn 't happen until 1905. Third, 
the creation of a state depositor's insurance fund would attract addition-
al deposits into banks and therefor provide additional reserves for loans. 
Fourth, the creation of the Federal Reserve System with membership of 
state banks further strengthened the banking system again increasing the 
attractiveness of the industry for investment purposes. All of this finally 
drew Garner into the banking industry, but not until these conditions had 
been met. 
As a closing note, Garner would retain ownership of the First State 
Bank of Uvalde until 1960, when he would sell it to another prominent 
Uvalde businessman/ politician, Dolph Briscoe, Jr., who was elected Gov-
ernor of Texas in 1972. The Briscoe family still owns and heads up the 
bank today. 
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